Spanish War, Decolonization War (of which Algerian War was the most important, for us French), Lebanon, (ex) Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Syria, Ukraine ...We have a rich and detailed documentary base to analyze the mechanics of a civil war, from its beginnings to the armed confrontation. We will intentionally leave out of this article the wars of decolonization (we will focus on them in the chapter "intelligence and penetration of structures"), and concentrate on the feedback from the participants (regardless of the camp, the main thing being the "experience" and the methodology used to overcome or bypass such and such a problem). All civil wars are not alike, but all of them have one or more points in common when it comes to the stages that lead to a collapse of normality on all or part of the national territory - without addressing the cause or causes that lead to the conflict:

 

  • A quick shortage of essential products (medicines, water, food, fuel ...) - especially in large urban centers with regard to water and food
  • The almost immediate introduction of a "black" market - a direct consequence of the shortage
  • The significant increase in predatory acts , including rape
  • The significant increase in mortality - except for acts of war or predation - of the weakest (mainly infants, children, the elderly and the sick) with the main causes being the lack of food, care, heating or the skills of medical personnel
  • Progressive and constant collapse of state or public services (police, sewage maintenance services, communication, supply chains, rescue services...)
  • The takeover of areas (of territories) defined by groups that will develop predation in order to establish a form of "power" - on the same basis as a fiefdom in the Middle Ages
  • The resurgenceIt is a mixture of religious facts, community or intra-community confrontations, and militias, more or less constituted, more or less hierarchical and more or less... alcoholic.
  • The resurgence of infections and diseases that were previously under control or almost unknown in the conflict zone - due to very poor sanitary conditions and health care structures.

The uplifting testimony (I invite you to read it carefully) of an unknown person during the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia, living in an urban area (thanks to the blog "le survivaliste").

We aknowledge that in the "triggering" phase, even though the open confrontation has begun, the belligerents do not have significant combat resources. Few weapons (and even less ammunition), limited means of communication (with, in particular, the "cutting off" of mobile telephone and internet networks) and the impossibility of identifying the "camp" of each participant. The transition from a civil society made up of a set of clans (families, groups of families or friends) that try to survive in isolation and by their own means is also striking. In this phase, where logistical networks are collapsing and industrial capacity is very limited, the situation - particularly in urban areas, which are very dependent on their supply chain - will be very difficult for civilians (civilians who are likely to become combatants), and human losses will be high, especially for already fragile populations (the elderly, infants, the poorest, the chronically ill, etc.). IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL - AND EVERYONE'S RESPONSIBILITY - TO HAVE RESERVES AND HIDING PLACES TO STOCKPILE AND PRESERVE THEM.

Fast enough (within a few weeks), supply networks - criminal or not - come to supply the different fighting factions with combat means (light weapons, ammunition, optics, but also heavier means), either via identified zones that allow connection with borders (by sea, road or air), or via systematic looting of the stocks present on the territory In addition to the means of combat (from the old walkie-talkie to the ammunition assembled by marksmen, smuggling equipment...), the parallel market will offer - with obviously very high inflation - the basic necessities (medicines, food, bottled water, fuel, medical equipment, firewood), with as currency not the national currency but either the usual reserve currencies (dollars, euro...) or by the introduction of barter, or the precious metals (copper, gold & silver)

It is therefore necessary to implement (it is logical but it goes better by saying it) six elements BEFORE to be faced with this type of situation - IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE FIRST POINT RESULTS FROM ALL OTHERS:

  1. Define general strategic objectives (let's make an acronym for simplicity: GSO). What do you want to achieve by considering - and having a PRAGMATIC vision that goes without emotions and ideological considerations but is based EXCLUSIVELY ON THE REALITY - your situation? Your position as a fighter by definition weak, poorly equipped and poorly trained (in two words you are an ass-comb with the dick, the knife, and the responsibility of a more or less important group) must lead you to a simple strategy: preserve the lives of your people by all means. For the moment, and in the absence of a positive evolution of your situation, it is your line of conduct in all aspects that allow survival. This is your one and only GSO. In a second time, and if you are still alive, it will be time to consider a stabilization, then an improvement (geographical, socialization and production) of your situation. This objective of survival is also a realization: YOU ARE NOT A SOLDIER, integrated in a structured group, but a "clan leader", a "warrior", left to your own devices in a hostile environment. Your decisions will make the difference between the life and death of your wives, your children and, more generally, your "world".
  1. Rally around you human resources (skills in general) necessary for the success of your goal, taking into account human affinities (obviously) and an essential need: the medical. Have a doctor with you or, failing that, a nurseis extremally valuable, because he/she will be able to provide care - emergency or more traditional - and secondly because he will be able to train other members of the group to provide care in case of emergency. He will also be able to define a hygiene protocol in living conditions that are inevitably conducive to diseases and their transmission within the group, define the logistical needs (medicine, first-aid products and packaging of a wounded person, etc.) and ensure a sanitary control - as strict as possible - over the food and water supplies. In addition to the doctor, each man (and woman), and apart from the status of combatant - ideally all members of the group should be able to use a weapon and actively participate in the fight - has a skill (electrician, farmer, mechanic...) that is specific to him. YOU DON'T NEED a consultant or a smoky "expert", but the skills that ensure the survival and comfort of all and the technical "superiority" over the enemy (as much as possible) in your environment. Skills and know-how must be shared as much as possible for a better versatility of men - a fighting peasant is more valuable than a fearful TV host.
  1. A mental, physical and technical preparation. Obviously this preparation must be done according to the standard modules of all the armies of the world - you just have to go on the internet to have access to a very rich documentary base (in English, French, Russian...) of all the aspects of a quality military training, from the most basic to the most technical. For French speakers there is a set of dedicated documents (well thought out, well designed, and quite regularly updated) written by the various staffs and services of the French army:
    1. The TTA (friendly acronym for Technique All Arms - weapon is understood as the technical specificity of a fighter, infantry, cavalry, genius ...) consists of a set of fascicles, boards and volumes (there are several tens, that I do not quote here but you will find more or less easily on the internet) to describe ALL aspects of the "military life" of the NRBC combat discipline. All of the TTAs are too big - and sometimes not worthwhile for the case of the civilian fighter - but we will remember:
      1. The 150 TTA (which makes 21 volumes ...) and which has the advantage of describing by the menu the general military training, the know-how and the skills of the NCO. I propose them here (except TITLE XXI entitled "Overseas and Abroad"), in the version of 2001 (and for some volumes before 2001). There is an "updated" version of 2006 and 2012 - maybe even more recent, I would make it available as soon as possible.
        1. TTA150 TITLE 1 - GENERAL MILITARY KNOWLEDGE
        2. TTA150 TITLE 2 - COMMAND IN DAILY LIFE
        3. TTA150 TITLE 3 - ROLE OF THE TRAINER
        4. TTA150 TITLE 4 - PROBING COMBAT IN OPEN MEDIA (2012 VERSION)
        5. TTA150 TITLE 5 - COUNTRY SERVICE
        6. TTA150 TITLE 6 - INFORMATION
        7. TTA150 TITLE 7 - SHOOTING AND SHOOTING
        8. TTA150 TITLE 8 - TRANSMISSIONS
        9. TTA150 TITLE 9 - TOPOGRAPHY AND OBSERVATION
        10. TTA150 TITLE 10 - MINES AND EXPLOSIVES
        11. TTA150 TITLE 11 - ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND - DISSIMULATION
        12. TTA150 TITLE 12 - CBRN DEFENSE
        13. TTA150 TITLE 13 - HYGIENE AND FIRST AID
        14. TTA150 TITLE 14 - MILITARY AND SPORTY PHYSICAL TRAINING
        15. TTA150 TITLE 15 - KNOWLEDGE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMAMENT
        16. TTA150 TITLE 16 - KNOWLEDGE AND MAINTENANCE OF TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT
        17. TTA150 TITLE 17 - KNOWLEDGE AND MAINTENANCE OF MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS
        18. TTA150 TITLE 18 - MAINTENANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT
        19. TTA150 TITLE 19 - PREVENTION AND FIRE FIGHTING
        20. TTA150 TITLE 20 - MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE
      2. The 117 TTA (Provisional Instructions of the Use of the Psychological Weapon), propaganda and counter-propaganda, use of psychology on the national territory and in time of war ... In short a small manual to "infect" the spirit of the enemy, support the morale of yours and guide the mood of allies or those who are "neutral". available here.
    2. The fascicles DIA (Doctrine Inter-Armées), CIA (Inter-Armed Concepts) or the PIA (Inter-Armed Publications). These booklets specify a set of technical points, present tactical points of view or even determine protocols when fighting NRBC, policing ... You will find them on the internet - I propose you a published by the CICDE: CPM n ° 51, the armed force and the city
  1. Dedicated logistics (all materials and commodities necessary for combat and survival) and thought according to:
    1. The size of your group (including the most fragile members of the group, the elderly, the very young, the sick and taking into account the biological differences between men and women).
    2. The type of area in which you evolve (urban, suburban, countryside...) and its geographical specificities (sea, mountain, plain...).
    3. Your ability to resupply or your constraints due to shortages (including ammunition, fuel, batteries, electricity, food and drinking water) - keep in mind that shortages inevitably reduce your ability to move and act.
    4. Taking into account specific risks (CBRN, industrial accidents or attacks that trigger large-scale pollution...). Even if you do not have the necessary budget to face this type of threats, you can buy simple elements (to enclose na area, to filter the ambient air...)
    5. The ABSOLUTE need to be mobile. Car, bus, bike...Be able to move as quickly and discreetly as possible depending on the situation or mission at hand.
  1. A communication network which can do without the antennas of the GSM, 3, 4 and 5G networks or VOIP: a network that uses the HF, VHF or UHF frequency ranges - depending on the communication distances. This type of network requires power (potentially on batteries and which will go through a transformer), one or more antennas - depending on the frequency band used and the range of your network and of course radios (integrated in vehicles, on an operation base, on a command post, portable like a talkie Walkie...). For optimal communication security, you have two options: either you have a substantial budget (I mean very substantial) and you purchase a scrambling module that will encrypt your exchanges, or you develop an encryption code in-house - it's tedious, complex and...free! You can use the Vigenère square, Polybe or another encryption method easily found on the internet.
  1. A base of operation (survivalists call it a BAD - Sustainable Autonomous Base) from which you will be able to rest, provide a sense of security, eat...in short, all the "normal" human activities, with spaces dedicated to children, the wounded...Think of your base of operations as a medieval fortress: very well defended, with abundant reserves, easily controllable and, if necessary, with a possibility of escape if the situation were to deteriorate too much. In essence, any base of operations is vulnerable (that's where the children, the elderly, a good part of your reserves and production capacities will be concentrated). It is therefore necessary to think about the defense of the perimeter, by ALL MEANS. The location chosen for this base of operations is essential. Ideally, it should be high up, with a good view of the surrounding area, an easy water supply (river, watering hole...) and "natural defenses" - mountainous area, cliffs... In short, think "fortress" as much as you can.

The only state structure that almost always seems to retain a capacity for coordination and centralization is the national army. This seems logical since it is the only structure that, by essence, has the means and trained personnel to intervene where "normality" no longer applies. The coherence of the army does not indicate that it will act in one way or another, nor even that all its components will work towards a unique and identified goal, but rather that it has the resources to protect its members, its holdings and one form of organization or another.

The national armyIn the case of a counter-insurgency operation, the government, which will be either an "arbiter" between the different factions, or a major player of a well identified faction - the government in place for example - will have to evolve its "classic" operating methods towards "counter-insurgency" methods, which may include police methods, and necessarily the adaptation of its processes in the face of an enemy that is not easily identifiable (intelligence is THE KEY to reduce an enemy that evolves "like a fish in water" within civil society - a small reference to one of our great enemies, General Giap). It should be noted that elements that would have defected (with weapons and equipment) can - due to logistical superiority - decide to take sides with one faction or another, to take over an area or simply to impose a faith (Mohammedan elements for example...) in a given area of the territory.

A short article entitled "the army facing the city" by Jean-Louis Dufour, former officer. At the end of the article, he discusses the particularity of weapon systems adapted to urban areas: the robot - by extension the drones.

The recent conflicts in Chechnya and the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Libya) - both linked to the resurgence of Islam (and to related phenomena, notably clan-based - no need to go back to the financing and aid given to Islamic organizations or other sympathetic militias by certain states) - have shown that the asymmetry of means is not a guarantee of victory for the camp that has the greatest strength, mainly because of (or thanks to) the high-density urban areas Every building, every underground network (railway network, subway, parking lots...) is a fort. Every open parking lot, every avenue or street are deadly shooting zones (see the Sniper alley during the siege of Sarajevo - Zmaja od Bosne street and Meša Selimović Avenue).

Obviously, each situation - by its very nature - will require a response adapted to your own means (you are not a professional army), you do not have a logistics chain et your technical level is low - at least at the beginning of hostilities

Informally, two interesting documents:

The French-style theory of fighting an armed insurrection on national soil (but later used by the American army, the CIA and certain South American or African regimes), drawn from the experiences of the decolonization conflicts in Indochina and Algeria, was proposed by Colonel Roger Trinquier in his book "  modern war "- the book is available here (readable but of mediocre quality).

Other French officers - most of them having written following their experience in Indo-China or Algeria (David Galula - against insurrection theory and practice & Marcel Bigeard - the intelligence officer's manual)

This theorizationIt was perfectly adapted to its time, but today it requires the taking into account of factors essential to the conduct of operations in the XNUMXst century, such as :

  • The judicialization of military operations (even if you are not considered a soldier in the sense of the Geneva Conventions, the risk is high - during the time when a legal and institutional structure continues to exist on the territory where you are fighting, or after the conflict if supra-state authorities (the UN...) decide to prosecute - at the national and international level
  • The evolution of the ethical sense and the importance given to the individual, which will INVARIABLY be used by your enemies for propaganda purposes to the media and public opinions (especially if the conflict is linked to an ethnic or religious communalization)
  • Communication channels and the fluidity of information transfer - social networks, the possibility of filming or taking photos with a simple phone and transmitting the files created in a few seconds, throughout the world

 

END OF FIRST PART OF ARTICLE

Leave a Reply