How to organize and implement the different missions of a group of fighters? How does the group leader define the objectives and protocols to be applied? How can a group formed or a pair of isolated combatants ensure its autonomy and remain proactive, even separated from its leaders and base? We will discover (and for some rediscover) the elementary acts of the combatant in direct contact with the enemy, through a simple explanatory and a set of patterns (coordination, articulation, reflex acts, various commands ...).
In addition to the technical aspect of the document and the presentation of a set of diagrams that will allow you to have at your fingertips a "memo" useful and adaptable to the different scenarios that you may be confronted with, this extract from the TTA 150 (edited by French armed forces) is a perfect basis for establishing the formation of combatants (from the soldier to the group leader), to teach him the basics of the infantry, and, more generally, to make him aware of his quality of warrior.
As a preamble a reminder of the "obligations" (in quotation marks since the completion of a warrior and his ability to go to the end is a set of factors) of the fighter and his leader. It is interesting to note that a small paragraph reproduces the obligations undertaken by France under the Geneva Conventions (even if the framework of a civil conflict on its own territory does not lend itself easily to the respect of the obligations in question).
The following three chapters indicate (and differentiate) the "reflex acts", the "elementary acts" and the main missions of the pair. It is on this part (modest in volume) that the trainers will concentrate the first modules of the training scheme, with in particular:
- Move, post and use your weapons
- Navigate in time and space
- Provide intelligence and keep in touch with his boss and base
- Shelter, hide and hide
- Defend yourself, secure a point or area
- Cross the lights and keep the fire rolling
Then come the "best practices" and the basic protocols that allow the command of a team, a group (a group being a set of teams - from 2 to 4) or a section. One passes on the intrinsic qualities of a leader to concentrate on one of the major aspects of an optimal group: his mobility and his ability to be autonomous (in his decisions at the tactical scale, in his logistic support ...). The focus is on one of the main missions of a group, the patrol. How to ensure the movement of men, how to modify it according to the requirements of the terrain or the detection of hostile elements, how to ensure an efficient and simple chain of command ...
The specificities of NRBC or antiaircraft (which are covered in the document) are not essential concerns of an organized militia which does not have the means of a national army, nor in logistical terms, nor in capacity to reaction. Nevertheless we can translate the recommendations of this document through the prism of technologies and chemical or biological elements that would inevitably be used in case of collapse of normality: drones, IED, weedkillers, improvised incendiary bombs ... And train men to taking into account this type of threat. Moreover, this type of risk is reminiscent of a key element: a hostile person is a hostile person, it is essential not to underestimate a force that is opposed to you.
Logistic ! We have already addressed this absolute, that grail of any fighter, without whom nothing is possible. In general articulated and implemented at a higher level, the configuration of a militia engaged in a civil conflict must make it the main concern (after the fight itself) of the head of "section" - or of the constituted group which is brings a volume closer to a section. Each action must be PREVIOUSLY subject to a control of the means implemented, according to:
- Expected duration of mission before return to base
- The type of mission - and therefore the risk potential
- Physical constraints suffered by the group
- From the "margin of comfort" that it is reasonable to carry
- And of course the nature of the land borrowed
The end of the document presents a very interesting scheme: the "low intensity" combat in crisis phase - after civil peace and before a total collapse of normality, with a technical approach of the excavation, the check point & the control. This type of work of "police" refers us to the works of Colonel Trinquier and Captain Galula (to read for "late" to read again for "those who have forgotten".
In short, safety, recognition, logistics, defense, zone ban, the chain of command, the ability to be autonomous ... Good reading!